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THE ORIGIN OF AN INQUIRY:
EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY IN JAMES' PRAGMATISM

J. Ellis Perry IV
University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth
"Much struck."
That was Darwin's way of saying that something he observed
fascinated him, arrested his attention, surprised or puzzled him. The
words "much struck" riddle the pages of both his Voyage ofthe Beagle
and his The Origin of Species, and their appearance should alert the
reader that Darwin was saying something important. Most of the
time, the reader can infer that something Darwin had observed was at
variance with what he had expected, and that his fai th in some alleged
law or general principle had been shaken, and this happened repeat
edly throughout his five year sojourn on the H.M.S. Beagle. The
"irritation" of his doubting the theretofore necessary truths of natu
ral history was Darwin's stimulus to inquiry, to creative and thor
oughly original abductions.
"The influence of Darwin upon philosophy resides in his ha ving
conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of transi tion, and
thereby freed the new logic for application to mind and morals and
life" (Dewey p. 1). While it would be an odd fellow who would
disagree with the claim of Dewey and others that the American
pragmatist philosophers were to no small extent influenced by the
Darwinian corpus,! few have been willing to make the case for
Darwin's influence on the pragmatic philosophy of William James.
Philip Wiener, in his well known work, reports that
Thanks to Professor Perry's remarks in his definitive
work on James, "the influence of Darwin was both
early and profound, and its effects crop up in unex
pected quarters."

Perry is a senior at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmoltth. Hc will join the Cwtre
Jor Philosophy, Technology and Society at the University of AberdcC1l, Scotland this jaIl,
where he will commence reading Jor a1l M. Wt. in Philosophy.
I There is no dearth of references for the impact of Darwin upon philosophy,
American or otherwise.
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But that being said, Wiener proceeds to "trace James' use of the
Darwinianideaofevolutionin Uames'] magnum opus, ThePl'inciples
ofPsychology," beyond which tomes Wiener felt no need to trespass
(as is clearly evinced by Wiener's choice of sources and citations)
(Wiener, p. 104). It is neither my intention to discuss why Wiener
decided to confine his investigation of James' Darwinism to The
Principles, nor whether Wiener was indeed justified in that decision.
Yet while reading the collectionofJames' 1906-1907 Lowell Institute
lectures (thereafter published as Pragmatism: A New Name for Some
Old Ways afThinking) , Iwas "muchstruck" by their Darwinianfeel, by
their Darwinian-sounding phrases, and by their general resonance
with the theory of evolution via descentwithmodification-"natural
selection." Whatever Wiener's reason for forsaking Pragmatism
and I suspect some over-reliance on the advice of R.B. Perry had
something to do with it-it seems to me that he ought not have.
Though Wiener's book is in many respects the seminal work on
the relationship between Darwin and the founders of the American
philosophical tradition known broadly as pragmatism, it is not the
only work that treats of this subject, and Wiener is not alone in his
virtual abandonment of Pragmatism in favor of other sources for
insights to James' dalliance with Darwin. Cynthia Eagle Russett, in
her Da1ilJin In America: The Intellectual Response 1865-1912, cites
Pragmatism only once,2 and Peter J. Bowler neglects Pragmatism
entirely. thereafter offering only the most pithy citations from James'
Principles. And while Michael Ruse (in his stimulating Taking Darwin
Seriously) was considerably more generous in his treatment of James
than either Russett or Bowler-Ruse actually cites Pragmatism in his
bibliography-he, too, did not apparently find the Lowell Institute
lectures as interesting a source for James' Darwinism as I have.
The important question that this raises is: Are these authors
justified in leaving Pragmatism out ojtheirpot'tt'ait ofJames as aDarwin
influenced philosopher? And while this question is quite germane to
my present agenda, I propose to answer it only by way ofoffering my
own celebration of what seems to me to be James' genuine evolution
2 James: "To determine a thought's meaning, we need only consider what
conduct it is fitted to produce." To her credit, she chose a passage which has a good
Darwinian word in it, that is, "fitted." The means-end relationship here is consistent
with my observations about James' Darwinian thinking, apropos adaptation,
adaptive traits, &c.
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ary epistemology.3 Should I succeed in convincing the reader that
there is much Darwinian thought in James' Pragmatism, and more
importantly, that James' remarks on common sense are best appre
ciated when read from a Darwinian point of view, then I feel that I
will have demonstrated that the above mentioned treatments of
James are, on this head, deficient.
Some perambulatory remarks are necessary:
I believe that Darwinian evolution may be an invaluable way to
frame what James had to say about, among other things, common
sense. While Wiener has focused almostexc1usively onhow Darwin's
work influenced James' physiological psychology-and I think
Wiener implies: by that route, James' philosophy-I hope to show
how James' thoughts on common sense can best be appreciated if one
thinks about them in terms of Darwinian evolution. It is, of course,
too easy to impose upon James evolutionary ideas which could
scarcely be called outgrowths of James' reading of Origin (&c.); and
to this extent these would not be, properly speaking. Darwinian in
origin. I have been careful not to use (e.g.) post-evolutionary synthe
sis ideas about molecular genetics to bring out the "evolutionism" in
James' pragmatism-even when these ideas genuinely resonate
with the spirit of Darwin's own evolutionary theories.
Pragmatism has long been esteemed as one of the classics of this
nation's indigenous philosophy. If our appreciation of Pragmatism is
to survive, if the slim tome is not to become extinct from the shelves
of college bookstores-or from syllabi-then we might wish to
consider the advantages of adapting our reading of it-in spite of
Wiener (et al.).
I. Evolutionary Epistemology: What is it?

The history of the use of the word' evolution' is itself interesting;
and were it not question-begging I would begin by saying that the
word has undergone considerable evolution before and since Dar
3 Ruse rejects thatJ ames ever adieu Ie ted an "eval u Honary ep istemology." This,
however, has as much to do with disagreements about what precisely "evolutionary
epistemology" is, as it does with (a) what James had to say about knowledge, ( b)
whatJames had to say abou t evolution and Darwin and (c) whatJames meant when
he said it!
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win.4 For our purposes, we may define' evolution' simply as achange
in form or behavior over time. To explain "evolutionary epistemology"
is a somewhat easier task, thanks to the new Blackwell '5 Companion to
Epistemology, which devotes three pages to the subject. Excerpts from
the first two paragraphs (for our present purpose) do an admirable
job of summing it up:
This is an approach to the theory of knowledge that
sees an important connection between the growth of
knowledge and biological evolution. An evolution
ary epistemolOgist claims that the development of
human knowledge proceeds through some natural
selection process, the best example of which is
Darwin's theory of biological natural selection. The
three major components of the model of natural selec
tion are variation, selection and retention ... [T]hose
variations that perform useful functions are selected,
while those that do not are not selected ... In the
modem theory of evolution, genetic mutations pro
vide the (random, non-directed] variations ... the
environment provides the filter of selection, and re
production provides the retention ... Evolutionary
epistemology applies this blind variation and selec
ti ve retention model to the growth of scientific knowl
edge and to thought processes in general (Blackwell,
p.122).
The "evolution" part is sometimes meant quite literally (d. Steven
Toulmin), while others intend only that knowledge, knowledge
acquisition, "belief fixing," obtain in an evolutionary sort of way:
Beliefs vary. and these differing beliefs "compete" for limited
attentional resources, for scarce cognitive space, for some functional
role in our lives. Some of these beliefs, owing to their present fitness
-Le.: their tried-and-true value in our lives-fare the struggle for
survival better than other beliefs; these beliefs are the ones that are
kept-and vvhich go on to support the production of other beliefs,
which will ensemble prOVide the firmament for future abductions.
4 Curiously, Darwin does not use the word "evolution" once in the first edition
(1859) of Origin. The closest he comes is the cognate "evolved "-it is the last ward ill
tlze book.
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Literal application of the theory of evolution to epistemic matters
is fraught with difficulties: First, "knowledge" is lumped together
with the set"all organic beings" and then the laws believed to obtain
for the laUer are applied to the former. A less objectionable exploita
tion of evolutionary principles (as described above) is as a model for
how persons fix beliefs (or, for how beliefs seem to get fixed), since
the principles of evolutionS are taken strictly heuristically.
The claim, then, is that the value of our reading James' Pragma
tism is enhanced if we understand it as an attempt to articulate a
theory ofknowledge which is based inpart on the Darwinian model
of evolution. 6 I will endeavor to unearth for the reader key passages
in the chapter on common sense which support my claim that James
intended his audience at the Lowell Institute to be thinking about
Darwin and his principles of biological evolution. I am assuming that
James accepted Darwinism, accepted the argument that species
evolved from a single common ancestor, that he rejected creationism
as well as Lamarckism (&c.) as alternative accounts of the origin of
species. A good question to ask at the outset, then, is this: What sorts

ofbeliefs about the world would someonewho accepted Darwinian evolution
be likely to have? And one sort of answer is this: uniformitarianism and
actualisltL.
II. "Uniformitarianism" and "Actualism"
Without going into great detail, it should be recalled that the way
for Darwin's evolutionary model and mechanism was paved in part
by the geologists of the earlier part of that century, who, challenging
Usher's pronouncement that the world was created by God in the
year 4004 B.C., attempted:
(1) to establish that the age of the earth was much greater than
5 While there is much agreement within the field. evolutionary biologists (to
include molecular geneticists working on evolutionary problems). there is still
much disElgreement about (e.g.. ) whether natural selection oc neutral drift is the
leading cause ofevalu Hon. how species ought to be qualified. &c. It would be wrong
to believe tha t there is one and only one" evol u tionary theory." I am gra teful tha ~ for
the purpose of this paper. I shall not need to trespass too far beyond the well
established and generally accepted core of post-evolutionary synthesis thought.
6 An additional daim is. of course, implied, namely that Wiener (et al.) erred by
not reading Pragmatism with Darwin in mind.
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that affirmed by ecclesiastical authority, and
(2) that the physical characteristics of the earth were the result
of natural phenomena, and not supernatural megaphenomena.
The rejection ofvarious "Vulcanist" and UN eptunian" catastrophic
theories was made possible chiefly through the efforts of James
Hutton and Charles Lyell? whose separate efforts combined in time
for Darwin to have a world which was both old enough and inher
ently dynamic enough to be the stage for evolution. According to
uniformitarianism, "processes now seen by humans to operate could
have operated when humans were not watching." (Ridley, p. 43).
Uniformitarianism was, among other things, an argument against
the necessity of supernatural causes. The earthquakes and volca
noes, storms and mud slides that now occur throughout the world
have probably always gone on; and given enough time, these forces
could have molded the present landscape like so much putty. There
was no need to postulate God's creative hand in shaping the moun
tains, in carving out the valleys; time and the mundane physical
forces such as those now known could have given our planet its
complexion. Darwin betrays his uniformitarianism in Voyage, when
he relates his experience of witnessing an earthquake while at
Concepcion:
A bad earthquake at once destroys our oldest associa
tions: the earth, the very emblem of solidity, has
moved beneath our feet like a thin crust over a fluid
-one second of time has created in the mind a
strange idea of insecurity, which hours of reflection
would not have produced. (VB, p. 303).8
Do we find any evidence that James espoused the uniformitarian
hypothesis? Yes, though admittedly, trivially so; it would be more
strange for a man of science such as James to not have accepted
Lyelliangeology. Be that as it may, there is one passage in "Pragma
7 My chief source of information about Hutton, Lyell and the birth of historical
geography has been The DiscovenJ of Time. Consult index for pertinent passages.
8 I think that it is interesting that Peirce, also a child of the 19th century's
"evolutionism," wrote: "That single events should be hard and unintelligible, logic
will permit without difficulty: we do not expect to make the shock of a personally
experienced earthquake appear natural and reasonable by any account of cogita
tion" (The Doctrine of Necessity Examined, 1892).
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tism and Common Sense" that clearly suggests that James wished to
remind his audience of the value of unifonnitarian theories as such,
apart from their well-known application in historical geology:
New truths are ... resultants of new expeliences and
of old truths combined and mutually modifying one
another. And since this is the case ofchanges ofopinions

oftoday, there is not reason to assume that it has not been
so at all times (p. 78).
That is: the habits of mind, the peculiarities of mental life, the way in
which persons think about the world, has not changed. But why
should it be important for James to show that the way men and
women think in 1907 is not different from the way men and women
thought in 18077 1707? 7077 It is important, as we shall see, because
James is to play upon the Darwinian theme of descent with modifi
cation, upon the idea of inheritance. This germ of uniformitarian
thought, then, may be counted as our first bit of evidence in favor of
James' use of evolutionary principles in and throughou t Pragmatism.
The second edge of the anti-catastrophic sword is actualism.
While uniformitarianism is a statement about the kinds of forces
(natural, common) which given sufficient time have the power to
cause great change, actualism is a statement about the magnitude of
those forces. For example, the uniformitarian hypothesis would
explain the denudation of the Weald9 by the action of the waves; but
it is the actualist hypothesis that argues against the occurrence of a
"single diluvian wave." There is no need to invoke forces greater in
magnitude than those we actually observe; all of the forces of change
are publicly knowable, and these observable forces are sufficient to
account for all historical change. On this head Darwin had written:
as modern geology has almost banished such views
as the excavation of a great valley by a single diluvial
wave, so will natural selection, if it be a true principle,
banish the belief of the continued creation of new
organic beings, or of any great and sudden modifica
tion in their structure (OS, p. 285).
9 The Weald is a horseshoe-shaped tract of land on the eastern coast ofEngland.
due west of Dover.
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[The actualist hypothesis having been flushed-out, Darwin later
fleshes it out:]
If, then, we knew the rate at which the sea commonly

wears away a line of cliff of any given height, we
could measure the time requisite to have denuded the
Weald. Hence, under ordinary circumstances, I con
clude that for a cliff 500 feet inheight, a denudation of
one inch per century for the whole length would be an
ample allowance (OS, p. 285).
Statements such as these abound in Origin, and perhaps it was to one
such passage that James was referring when he wrote:
But when we look back, and speculate as to how the
common-sense categories may have achieved their
wonderful supremacy, no reason appears why it may
not have been by a process just like that by which ...
Darwin let al.] achieved [his] similar triumphs in
more recent times. In other words, [the common
sense categories] may have been successfully discov
ered by prehistoric geniuses ... [the common-sense
categories] may have been verified by the immediate
facts of experience which the first fitted; and then
from fact to fact and from man to man they may have
spread, until all language rested on them and we are
notincapable ofthinking naturally in any other terms.
Such a view would only follow the rule that has
proved elsewhere so fertile, [namely], of assuming
the vast and remote to conform to laws of formation
that we can observe at work in the small and near (P,
p.83).

This is as explicit a reference to actualism as one could hope to find
in any non-geological, non- evolutionary tract-but why would
James make it? Why would he wish to implant in the minds of his
audience the idea that the magnitude of those forces "that we can
observe at work in the small and near" would be sufficient to bring
our brute common sense from a remote age into the present? If we
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embrace my hypothesis-that James was thinking seriously about
Darwin and evolution when he articulated his "pragmatism"-then
the answer is plain.
As the Weald was made by the sustained, gentle lapping of the
sea upon the shore, so too has the mind of man been made by the
sustained attempts of our somewhat hairier forebears to come to
grips with the rude contingencies of life. The "booming, buzzing"
world which challenges us every day, confronts us at every tum, is
the same "world" in which our antecedents were immersed, just as
it is the same sea which has long nibbled away at the chalk cliffs of
Dover. The net effect of this ceaseless tide of experience upon the
human intellect is a brain, a nervous system, a mind peculiarly
adequated to this "red in tooth and claw" natural world. Not only
does James here deftly dispatch of any lingering transcendental a
priori-isms, but he provides a thoroughly naturalistic account of the
origin of common sense. If this is a fair appraisal of what James was
really up to, then, we too may concede that James was to some extent
mindful of the effects of inheritance on the one hand and differential
fitness on the other. In other words, James would have to have been
thinking about descent with modification, mitigated by some form of
(natural?) selection against disutility.
III. Natural selection

What would be the features of a genuine evolutionary epistemology?
Again, ifthe "epistemology" itself only uses "evolutionary" concepts
as a model, then we must only be able to analogize epistemological
concepts into evolutionary ones, and then apply the theory of evolu
tion-in this case, Darwin's theory-to the epistemological con
cepts. How convincing the theory of knowledge is will be a function
of (a) how well the paradigm retains its integrity, and (b) how well
the paradigm works for the ideas therein treated. That is, an evolu
tionary epistemology can fail to be either "evolutionary" or much of
a theory of knowledge if, on the one hand, the model of evolution is
changed too radically in order to accommodate the epistemologist's
agenda, or, on the other hand, if there is little payoff from the
application of the evolutionary model.
Since Darwin explained evolution by way of the mechanism of
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natural selection, the most important aspect of any so-called "Dar
winian epistemology" is the application of this mechanism to episte
mological constructs (i.e., beliefs, ideas, the relations between these
and "truth," and the whole host of terms the epistemologist uses), We
must therefore begin by articulating what "natural selection" means
to the evolutionary biologist, and Ridley has defined it thus:
natural selection: Process by which the forms of an
organism in a population that are best adapted to the
environment increase in frequency relative to less
well-adapted forms over a number of generations.
(Ridley, p. 638),
In Pragmatism, the beliefs take the place of "forms of an organism,"
and everything else in the definition remains the same. Therefore, the
position of James for which I am arguing is this: That some of the
beliefs of individuals are best adapted to the environment of those
indi viduals, and that as a result of differential fitness of these beliefs,
their frequency in the population will tend to increase relative to the
frequency of other beliefs in the population as a whole.
In order for natural selection (in the biological sense) to work,
three fadorsmust obtain. Weneed now to present these, and then see
if our epistemology can be squared with them. They are:
.
(1) characters of organisms must be variable; e.g., no two
gimffe necks are exactly the same length, at that there is a naturally
occurring continuum of the length of giraffe necks;
(2) these characters must be heritable; e.g., the genes/ gene
complex responsible for the character here defined as "giraffe neck"
must be able to be passed from parents to offspring; and
(3) the genotype (genes for characters) must have the effect of
differential fitness, when expressed in the phenotype (physical form);
e.g., the slight differences in length of the giraffe neck must place
some individuals at an advantage, and others at a disadvantage,
relative to the frequency of necks of certain lengths in the population.
Here again we must extrapolate from the ideas of biology to those
of epistemology; and this is easily enough done. The "characters,"
here, are our beliefs, and these indeed are variable. No two persons
beli eve exactly the same thing, about the same thing, at the same time;
and if it were possible to catalog all of the beliefs heldby two persons
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it is unlikely that we would discover that they have exact! y the same

beliefs, though many beliefs-both correct and incorrect (e.g., that
Paris is the capital of France, that a tomato is a vegetable) -would
indeed be the same. Furthermore, these beliefs are "heritable," in the
sense that beliefs can be passed from one individual to another.
Educators and parents, for example, pass on beliefs to their students
and children, and daily, we are each exchanging and sharing ideas
with one another.lO Beliefs, then, are "heritable," or at least for our
purposes, heritable enough. Lastly-and this is the upshot of James'
lectures-we get different results from the possession of different
beliefs; those beliefs that do not work for us we jettison, while in
contrast we may tend to better fasten-down those that do work, and
which are, due to their utility, more highly valued by us. Experience
is the crucible, and we will weed out those beliefs that are "unfit."
It is worthwhile to note that this is a very individualistic truncat
ing, and that the units of selection are individuals, and not groups;
this is a point commonly misunderstood about Darwin and his
scheme for evolution via natural selection, but not apparently by
James. It just so happens that certain beliefs, like certain "heritable
characters," will grow in frequency throughout a given population
because these beliefs happen to have tried-and-true value and do tend
to be useful to their possessor. For example, James might say that
most persons profess to believe in God, or to have some theologico
spiritual commitment as a result of some religious experience. The
fact that an individual may have such-and-such belief (say, about the
existence of a Spirit) is not a function of the prevalence of that belief
in the "belief pool" (like "gene pool") of the population; rather the
prevalence of the belief among many individuals is an indication of
the utility and value of the belief of those who have it. This "fitness"
of (e.g.) spirituality is responsible for its high frequency in the belief
pool, andifthe belief did not confer some advantage to its possessors,
its frequency distribution (in individuals and in the population)
would drop. If the frequency dropped enough the belief would go
IOPapers published in 1993 in both Scientific AmeriCilu and Americil/! Scientist
address the issue of "horizontal gene transfer," or, "horizontal drift," which postu
lates that some parasites (e.g., viruses) are able to transfer genetic material (DNA)
from one species to another. Thus the "hereditary" aspect of cu I tural, non-biological
information (per contra the biological information of DNA) seems to have now a
more sure analogical footing than it did in James' time.
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"extinct." The analogy between genes and beliefs is a good one; but
if we are to be justified in attributing the full complement of these
evolutionary ideas to James, we must turn to what James actually
had to say; and we will now tum to Pragmatism.
IV. Pragmatism and Common Sense
James notes that "the world does genuinely change and grow,"
but that "knowledge grows in spots," and that "knowledge never
grows all over" (P, p. 77). That knowledge "grows" implies that
knowledge changes, and James explicitly remarks that the "modifi
cations [of knowledge] are apt to be gradual" (P, p. 77). Localized,
gradual change is in many ways the soul of Darwin's theory of
evolution, and I think it is unlikely that James just happened to
express his ideas about the dynamics of knowledge in Darwinian
terms; James was thinking about knowledge in evolutionary terms,
andthese words suggest a Jamesian version of Natura nonfacit saltum.·
James tells his audience that "novelties" in thinking are gradually
introduced to our storehouse of opinions, and then, when the need
arises, we "modify [the novelties] to some degree" (P. p. 78). This
activity is not unlike that of the pigeon fanciers, whom Darwin treats
at length in chapter I of the Origin, titled, Variation under Domestica
tion. Who could have foreseen that a pigeon fancier would select the
slight tendency of a pigeon to fall head over heels, and by exploiting
this queer novelty producing the breed of tumbJers? Or again: Who
could have foreseen that the natural pausing of some dogs could be
modified by breeding into the useful trait of "pointing"? These
novelties were acquired genetically by the organism, and were later
made use of by the fancier or sportsman. The storehouse of genetic
information in organic things is not unlike the storehouse ofinforma
tion which minds acquire through time, which, like genetic diversity,
may someday be marshaled to the front for use.
Most surprising to me was, perhaps, the discovery of a quote by
a late 20th century evolutionary biologist which echoes what James
s,lid to his 1907 audience at the Lowell Institute. While this is not
evidence in fnvor of] ames' debt to Darwin, Ithink it is evidence that
. Ed. note: Natura
makes no leap.

110/1 fa cit

sa/tul/l (na to'tlr'a non fa-sit sal'hm). lntin. nature
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there is something genuinely Darwinian about James' thought on
epistemological matters. Keeping in mind the achronism, James said
of the dynamics of knowledge,
We patch and tinker more than we renew. The nov
elty soaks in; it stains the ancient mass; but it is also
tinged with what absorbs it. Our past apperceives
and cooperates; and in the new equilibrium in which
each step forward in the process of learning termi
nates, it happens relatively seldom that the new fact
is added raw (P, p. 78).
There is much here that smacks of biological evolution: the close
interaction between the genotypic milieu and its phenotypic mani
festation, the acquisition of "novelty," &c. But of chief interest to me
is the first sentence, which I think all will agree is startlingly similar
to that of Jacob, who once described the mechanism of evolution
thus: UN atural selection does not work like an engineer. It works like
a tinker" (Mayer). My argument for the existence of James' willful
and intentional comparison between (a) natural selection as the
means of organic evolution and (b) a broader "evolutionary model"
of our epistemic kinesis, again, seems to have some foundation.
The title of the lectures (as published by Longmann) is Pragma
tism: Or, A New Nmne for SOlne Old Ways OfThillking. But how old is
"old"? I think we can have a good laugh at the expense of so
scrupulous an exegete as Wiener (et a1.): by "old," James intended us
to think of "old" in Lyellian, Darwinian terms, and to think of the
word ancestraL If this is so, then the exclusion of Pragmatism from the
literature on early evolutionary epistemological theories is unforgi v
able. The following is perhaps the best support for James' Darwinian
agenda:
It follows that very ancient modes of thought may

have survived through all the latter changes in men's
opinions. The most primitive ways of thinking may
not yet be wholly expunged. Like our five fingers, our
ear-bones, our rudimentary caudal appendage, our
other 'vestigial' peculiarities, they may remain as
indelible tokens in our race-history. Our ancestors
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may have stuck on a certain way of thinking which
theyrnight conceivably not have found. But once they
did so, and after the fact, the inheritance continues ...
You may rinse and rinse the bottle, but you can't get
the taste of the medicine or whiskey that first filled it
wholly out (P, p. 78).
The following report of some observations should, for my present
purposes, suffice:
First: There is the appeal to some ancient time, and to units of
change (opinions), and to differential survival of those units of
change. These are the essential ingredients in the evolutionary
epistemologist's soup.
Second: The references to both (a) our inability to completely
"expunge" certain aspects of our thinking. and (b) the vestigiality of
some characters of thought are most assuredly owed to the swell of
interest inrudimentary/vestigial organs which-while not new with
Darwin-was given new importance after 1859. The "five fingers"
pentadactyly, which is expressed in all mammals (and other taxa)
is still today one of the best known morphological homologies cited
in favor of descent with modification. The "ear-bones," like the hand
bones and jaw bones treated of by Sir Charles Bell (1774-1842) in his
1833 Bridgewater Treatise The Hand: Its Mechanism and Vital Endow
ments as Evincing Design, were popular subjects of debate after the
publication of the Origin, and so the audience likely understood the
reference as one being to evolutionary explanations. i1
Third: The references to the"caudal appendage" (clearly playing
with ideas on human evolution) and to '''vestigial' peculiarities"
were most assuredly summoned to James' mind from reading chap
ter 13 of the Origin, particularly the section titled "Rudimentary
Organs." Of all of Darwin's arguments in favor of evolution via
descent with modification, his appeal to embryology and to struc
tural morphology were among the most impressive, and made the
greatest impreSSion upon men of science of the day. It is not surpris
ing, therefore, that James would frame his views on the remnants of
ancient "inherited" beliefs and opinions within the context of vesti
gial organs, especially if it was James' agenda to articulate an evolu
11

See Gould, Stephen J. "This View of Life." Natural History. August 1993.
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tionary epistemology. But without such a reading of James, his
genius (as seen in the brilliant bottle metaphor) might be under
esteemed.
So James at last announces his thesis on page 79:
My thesis now is this, that our fundamental ways of
thinking about things are discoveries ofexceedingly remote
ancestors, which have been able to p1'eserve themselves
throughout the experience of all subsequent time. [The
fundamental ways of thinking about things] form one
great stage of equilibrium in the human mind's de
velopment, the stage of common sense. Other stages
have grafted themselves upon this stage, but have
never succeeded in displacing it.
And indeed, why should common sense be "displaced"? The fact that
it hasn't been overthrown, that it hasn't been jettisoned from the

hold, is testament to its sustained utility in time. Commonsense has high
fitness. By speaking in such rich detail about the transmission of this
primordial common sense from our "exceedingly remote ancestors"
to ourselves, James reveals his commitment to some "epistemic
principle o.f inheritance," and what's more his postulation of "other
stages" of thinking (with which common sense competed) suggests
variation in the beUefpool over time. Variety? Heredity? Differential
fitness? ... Evolution.
The sophistication of James' appreciation oBhe complexities of
evolution may be judged from the following. One of the biggest
problems for evolutionary biology to this day is: IIow do we know when
something is really an "adaptation"? The hypothesis that there will be
adaptations is one thing. but their discovery, their recognition is
another. (Darwin was mindful of this, as was he concerned with the
tangentially related question of how common ancestors can be
identified given the quite imperfect fossil record). Ridley has written
on this matter:
t

The methods of studying adaptation work well if we
are studying an adaptation. If the character under study
is an adaptation then it must exist because of natural
selection and it is correct to persist in looking for the
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reasonwhyitisfavored ... However,ifa character (or
different forms of it) is not favored by natural selec
tion, the method breaks down. Methods of studying
adaptation should therefore be coniined to characters
that are adaptive. Probably, in practice, they mainly
are ... However, there is still plenty of room for
controversy (Ridley, p. 347).

Ifthe matter of explaining adaptations is of concern to the evolution
ary biologist, and if James really was thinking about evolution (and
was distilling evolution into epistemology), then we should expect to
find some indication that he too was concerned about adaptive
explanation. And we do (though for James it is beliefs and knowl
edge that are the acquired characters, and are thus the objects of
adaptive change):
In philosophy, [a man's common sense] means his
use of certain intellectual forms or categories of
thought ... It might be, too ... that such categories,
unimaginable by us today, would have on the whole
proved serviceable for handling our experiences
mentally as those which we actually use (P, p. 79).

James will conclude his remarks on common sense by informing the
audience that (1) "all our theories are instrumental, are mental modes
of adaptation to reality," and by suggesting that (2) "Profusion, not
economy, may after all be reality's key-note" (P, p. 87).
Regarding (1): Utility and adaptation had their first genuine
synthesis with the natural historians, who saw the adaptation of
means to ends in nature (e.g., the hawks eyes) as evidence of the
magnificence ofthe creator, butitwas Darwin who provided the first
viable mechanism for a naturally occurring means of such means
end adequation. I would tend to bet that James was here making
reference to Darwin, and not to Bell or Paley.
Regarding (2): I invite the reader to consider whether James was
addressing the quote popularized by Darwin: "Nature is prodigal in
variety, niggardly in innovation;" I suggest that James was (OS, p.
461).

THE ORIGIN OF AN INQUIRY
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V. Conclusion
All of James' Darwinian-sounding remarks in Pragmatism may
have some other cause, or they may be merely Darwinian "sound
ing," but not necessarily intended by James to be "Darwinian" in
flavor. The list of prominent authors who have maintained that
Darwin's influence on the ideas ofJames was both (a) limi ted and (b)
confined chiefly to James' physiological psychology is long, and my
study of James and the Jamesian corpus is short; I therefore cannot in
good academic faith say that I have made an airtight case against
those authors who have not dealt directly with Pragmatism.
I do, however, hope that reader was "much struck" by the
siInilarities between Darwinian evolution via descent with modifica
tionandJames' theory ofknowledge, his "dynamic coherentism" (as
I have elsewhere called it) as it was presented in the Lowell Institute
lectures; I also hope that I have taken a small step towards demon
strating that "mere coincidence" may not be the best explanation for
this. It is, at any rate, clear to this student that Jrunes' Pragmatism was
an attempt to articulate an evolutionary epistemology-and that
seems to be a possibility that has not been mOl'e rigorously explored
by scholars of greater ability and resource than myself.* But what
ever may come from this short study. (to quote Darwin), "It is
interesting to contemplate an entangled bank," which the Darwin
James! evolution-epistemology nexus certainly is; and I would be
pleased to have, in however small a way, enlarged the perspective of
the reader.
* Addendum: No study of Darwin'S influence on James would be
complete if it did not include a reading of Robert J. Richards' Da/10in
and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories ofMind and Behavior (Chi
cago, 1987), It is with no small measure of embarrassment that I
report that I happened upon this work after this paper had been
submitted. But much to my surprise, (and to my delight!) Roberts
who cites some 20 works by James, and who treats James at great
length-does not include Pragmatism in his bibliography.
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